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MASSACHUSETIS

LAW-LANDLORD-TENANT

TORT

LAw

AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE

IMPLICATIONs-Great Atlantic & Pa
cific Tea Co. v. Yanofsky, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 897, 403 N.E.2d
370.
-AN ANALYSIS OF FUTURE

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Yanofsky! effected three significant
changes in landlord-tenant law. The decision abolished two tradi
tional rules concerning landlord-tenant tort law and established a
new, progressive rule. The "failure to repair" rule 2 had directed
that a landlord who entered into an agreement to repair leased
premises and who knowingly refused to make necessary repairs
could not be held liable in tort. Instead, the landlord could be
found liable only on a contract theory for the cost of making the re
pairs. Yanofsky abolished this rule. 3 The landlord in this case was
held liable in tort for the foreseeable consequences of his failure to
make repairs.
Yanofsky overruled a prior supreme judicial court decision,
Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 4 which held that a
lessor's failure to repair a screen in accordance with the parties'
oral agreement was an omission and did not give rise to an action
in tort. The Chelefou decision rested on the distinction between
the landlord's nonfeasance and his misfeasance. 5 Nonfeasance
would result if a landlord agreed to make repairs and failed to do
so. Under this theory, he could be held liable only for the cost of
making the repairs. 6 If, on the other hand, a landlord agreed to
make repairs but did so in a negligent manner, he would have
been held liable for misfeasance. Parties injured by the landlord's
misfeasance were allowed to recover against him in tort. 7 Another
facet of this rule governed the consequences when a landlord made
1. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 897, 403 N.E.2d 370.
2. See generally Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283 (1919); Tuttle
v. George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887).
3. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374.
4. 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937).
5. Id. at 240, 8 N.E.2d at 772.
6. Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919).
7. Id.
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repairs gratuitously in the absence of an express agreement to re
pair. He was held liable for injuries caused by the faulty repairs
only if the plaintiff could prove gross negligence. 8
By implicitly overruling Chelefou , Yanofsky laid to rest the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance that commonly
had been relied on to determine liability in earlier decisions. 9 Nei
ther the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance nor the
failure to repair rule itself was considered by the Yanofsky court to
be responsive to contemporary views of the landlord-tenant rela
tionship. A Massachusetts landlord who simply refuses to repair
unsafe conditions on rental premises no longer can avoid tort liabil
ity while a landlord who in good faith attempts to make such re
pairs is held liable in tort for repairing in a negligent manner.
The most significant aspect of Yanofsky, however, is its hold
ing concerning a landlord's liability to his tena~t for injuries suf
fered by third parties. The court found that a lessor's express
agreement to make repairs "should be construed as an agreement
to indemnify the lessee against any loss or damage sustained by
him"lO as a result of injury incurred by third parties due to the
landlord's failure to make repairs. 11 By implying an agreement to
indemnify, the court significantly expanded its protection of inno
cent tenants: tenants are now insulated from liability incurred as a
result of unsafe premises.
This note discusses both the evolution of the rules governing
the landlord-tenant relationship and the immediate effects of
Yanofsky on landlord-tenant tort issues in light of their historical
origins. The probable impact of the Yanofsky decision on four addi
tional aspects of landlord-tenant law then will be explored:
Whether an agreement to indemnify will be implied in a residen
tiallease from an express agreement to repair;12 whether an agree
ment to indemnify will be implied in a residential lease in the ab
sence of an express agreement to repair;13 whether an agreement
to repair will be implied in a commercial lease;14 and whether an

8. Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 398, 124 N.E. 74, 84 (1919).
9. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. See text accompanying notes 172-79 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 180-91 infra ..
14. See text accompanying notes 194-209 infra.
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agreement to indemnify will be implied in a commercial lease
which does not include an express agreement to repair. 15

II. BACKGROUND
In 1950 a lease agreement was executed between plaintiff,
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) , and the owner of
the property which was later acquired by defendant, Robert
Yanofsky.I6 The lease was for a term of five years with options to
renew. I7 A & P renewed the lease six times, the last renewal to
expire in 1980. 18 The lease agreement provided for the lessee, A &
P, to make all necessary incidental interior repairs and for the les
sor to make all outside repairs. I9 The lease also included a provi
sion granting the lessor a right of access at reasonable hours to in
spect and make repairs. 2o All provisions in the lease dealing with
responsibility for repairs were "continued in force with each re
newal, and were in effect at the time [of the accident which gave
rise to this lawsuit]. "21
A &. P's store manager first discovered a leak in the roof in De
cember of 1974. 22 On December 17, 1974, the store manager
wrote a letter informing the lessor, Yanofsky, of the leak. 23
Upon receiving the letter Yanofsky took steps to insure that the
roof would be repaired. 24 While awaiting repair of the roof, A & P
employees attempted to reduce the potential danger caused by the
wet floor. Buckets were strategically placed to catch the water
dripping from the leaky roof 25 The water on the floor was mopped
up on various occasions. 26 In addition, shopping carts were used to

15. See text accompanying notes 194-213 illfra.
16. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 898,403 N.E.2d at 371-72.
17. ld. at 898, 403 N.E.2d at 372.
18. ld.
19. ld.
20. ld. Nothing in the record indicates that the lessor was prevented from mak
ing such repairs.
21.
22.
23.

leI.
leI.
leI.

24. Several years prior to the date in question, a roofing contractor had been
hired to build a new roof on the store in order to remedy similar leakage problems.
The testimony of Yanofsky at trial showed that he unsuccessfully tried to contact the
roofer by telephone. Yanofsky then sent him a letter, dated December 19, 1974, re
questing that necessary repairs be made. ld.
25. leI. at 898-99, 403 N.E.2d at 372.
26. ld.
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detour customers away from the hazardous area. 27 No repairs were
made, however. On December 23, 1974 a customer, Mrs. Marie
Vahey, slipped and fell, fracturing her hip.28 No precautions were
taken by A & P on the day of the accident. 29
Counsel for Mrs. Vahey negotiated a settlement with A & P
for $20,000. 30 Mrs. Vahey agreed to settle for this amount and on
September 25, 1975 executed a release of all claims against A &
P.31 She expressly reserved her right to file suit against all other
parties. 32 Mrs. Vahey then filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior
Court against Yanofsky. That action, after joinder with the instant
suit by A & P against Yanofsky for indemnification, was settled in
midtrial. 33 In the action for indemnification, defendant, Yanofsky,
moved for a directed verdict after plaintiff had presented its case
and again after all the evidence had been presented. 34 In his
motions Yanofsky challenged plaintiffs evidence as insufficient to
support a jury finding of an express or implied agreement for in
demnification. He further contended "that the evidence was insuf
ficient to warrant the jury in finding that A & P incurred damages
as a result of Yanofsky's breach of any terms of the lease."35 Both
motions were denied. 36
The jury found that A & P had acted reasonably in settling
Mrs. Vahey's claim,37 that the injury to Mrs. Vahey was a reason
ably foreseeable result of Yanofsky's failure to make repairs,38 that
A & P was not contributorily negligent,39 and that an implied

27. Id.
28. Id. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372.
29. Id. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 376.
30. ld. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372.
31. ld.
32. ld.
33. ld. at 899 n.3, 403 N.E.2d at 372 n.3.
34. ld. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372.
35. ld. at 897-98, 403 N.E.2d at 371.
36. ld. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372.
37. ld. at 906, 403 N.E.2d at 376.
38. ld. at 904, 403 N.E.2d at 375.
39. ld. Contributory negligence on the part of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. [hereinafter referred to as A & P] had been asserted due to the condition of floor
tiles at the time the leak was discovered. The tiles were alleged to be uneven and in
need of repair. The supreme judicial court found the judge's instructions to the jury
to be sufficient regarding contributory negligence. "The judge clearly and repeatedly
instructed the jury that if they found negligence on the part of A & P, the latter
could not recover in indemnification." ld. at 905-06, 403 N.E.2d at 376.
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agreement to indemnifY arose from Yanofsky's express agreement
to make repairs. 40
The supreme judicial court affirmed the superior court's denial
of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 41 The court held that
Yanofsky's duty to make all outside repairs obligated him to rem
edy the hazard created by the leaky roof within a reasonable time
of notification. 42 The court reasoned that because the lease's terms
were unambiguous regarding the agreement to repair, there was
no factual dispute concerning the existence of an implied agree
ment to indemnifY.43 Thus, the agreement to indemnifY was im
plied as a matter of law. 44 The court mentioned, but did not rely
upon, the legislative intent· of chapter 186, section 19 of the
Massachusetts General Laws which states that a lessor must exer
cise reasonable care to correct, within a reasonable time, any
unsafe condition which he knows or ought to know exists. 45 The
statute provides any victim injured while lawfully on the premises
with a right of action against the lessor.46 The Yanofsky court rea
soned:
[T]hat a lessee ... that is "injured" by virtue of being reasonably
obliged to settle a claim for personal injuries which were caused
by the lessor's failure to repair an unsafe condition within a rea

40. hi. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 375.
41. ld. at 906, 403 N.E.2d at 376.
42. ld. at 901-02, 403 N.E.2d at 373.
43. ld. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 373-74.
44. ld.
45. ld. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977) states that:
A landlord or lessor of any real estate except an owner-occupied two- or
three-family dwelling shall, within a reasonable time following receipt of a
written notice from a tenant forwarded by registered or certified mail of an
unsafe condition, not caused by the tenant, his invitee, or anyone occupying
through or under the tenant, exercise reasonable care to correct the unsafe
condition described in said notice except that such notice need not be given
for unsafe conditions in that portion of the premises not under control of the
tenant. The tenant or any person rightfully on said premises injured as a re
sult of the failure to correct said unsafe condition within a reasonable time
shall have a right of action in tort against the landlord or lessor for damages.
Any waiver of this provision in any lease or other rental agreement shall be
void and unenforceable. The notice requirement of this section shall be
satisfied by a notice from a board of health or other code enforcement
agency to a landlord or lessor of residential premises not exempted by the
provisions of this section of a violation of the state sanitary code or other ap
plicable by-laws, ordinances, rules or regulations.
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977).
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sonable time, would have a cause of action against the lessor un
der the statute to recover such amounts reasonably paid. 47

Because Yanofsky breached his duty to repair, the lessee, A & P,
incurred an economic loss. The court held that the lessor's "express
agreement to make repairs should be construed as an agreement to
indemnifY the lessee. "48
The court also held that the landlord's failure to make repairs
in accordance with the agreement gave rise to a tort action. 49 Un
der the common-law failure to repair rule, the appropriate remedy
would have been an action for breach of contract by A & P against
Yanofsky for the cost of repairing the roof. In holding as it did, the
court abolished the common-law rule that a lessor's failure to re
pair, a nonfeasance, obligates him to pay only the cost of repairs. 50
This decision was the logical culmination of a trend, which began
in Massachusetts in 1973, to hold landlords to a higher standard of
care than had previously been imposed upon them. 51
Since 1973, the Massachusetts courts have come to accept the
modern view that a lease is not a conveyance of an interest in
land52 but rather is an exchange of covenants more akin to a con
tract. When a lease was perceived as a conveyance of property, it
was assumed that the tenant took complete control of the premises
when he took possession. The landlord, therefore, had no right to
enter or inspect and consequently could not be expected to make
repairs. 53 Thus, the tenant, being in total control of the premises,
was believed to be in the best position to make the necessary re
pairs. 54 The contemporary view of a lease as a contractual exchange
of promises, however, recognizes that the lessor, as well as the les
see, has obligations with regard to the maintenance of the prem
47.
48.

1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374.
ld.
49. ld. at 901-02, 403 N.E.2d at 373-74.
50. The rule was first espoused in Massachusetts in 1887. The supreme judicial
court held that a lessor was not Iiable'in tort for injuries to a farmer and his cow
when both fell through the floor of a rented barn. The lessor had agreed to repair the
rotted floor and had failed to do so. Tuttle v. George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass.
169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887).
51. See text accompanying notes 150-71 infra.
52. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
See notes 150-54 infra and accompanying text.
53. See Quinn & Phillips, The Late of Landlord-Tenallt: A Critical Evaluation
of the Past With Guideli,Jes for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 (1970).
54. ld. at 231-32. For a comparison of modern and agrarian tenants, see Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970).
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ises. The law eventually began to recognize the fact that the mod
ern tenant is less able to make repairs than the landlord. 55 This has
resulted in the imposition of increased responsibility on landlords
to maintain the premises in a safe condition. The outcome of the
accompanying change in judicial thinking is greater protection for
those who are injured as a result of unsafe conditions on rented
property. The duty imposed on a landlord to use reasonable care in
maintaining his property has expanded accordingly. 56 To fully un
derstand Yanofsky's place in this scheme and its present and future
implications, it is necessary to trace the history of the landlord
tenant relationship.

III.

HISTORY OF THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
IN THE UNITED STATES

The landlord-tenant relationship in the United States was orig
inally governed by the principle that a lease was the equivalent of
a conveyance of property from a landlord to a tenant. 57 This idea
was consistent with both parties' expectations in a rural agrarian so
ciety.58 Tenants were concerned with the land itself for they made
their living and paid their rent through farming. 59 Thus, it was of
great importance to tenants that they have exclusive possession of
the property, free from the lessor's interference. The landlord's
duty was merely to deliver possession and refrain from interfering
with the tenant's possessory rights. 60 The tenant's duty to pay rent
was independent of his right to use and possess the premises. 61 No
guarantees or warranties attached to the leased property because
55. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 239.
56. See text accompanying notes 150-70 infra.
57. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Yanofsky, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
902, 403 N.E.2d at 374; Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 731, 402
N.E.2d 1045, 1047; Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89,293
N.E.2d 831, 837, 840 (1973); Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 62, 67 (1809).
58. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89, 293 N.E.2d 831,
837 (1973).
59. "[T]he governing idea is that the land is bound to pay the rent. ... [W]e
may almost go to the length of saying that the land pays it through [the tenant's]
hand." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW § 6, at 131
(2d ed. 1898).
60. "In other words, for the term of the lease, the lands were subject to the ten
ant's, not the landlord's care and concern." Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 228.
61. "Thus, originally at common law, the tenant could not even escape his
rental obligations when the demised premises were destroyed because of the law's
view that the land and not the premises was the essential part of the transaction."
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189,293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973).

360

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:353

the buildings were considered to be of minimal importance. In
fact, the tenants considered the structures built on the leased land
to be incidental to the lease. 62 Thus, the property was leased "as
is." Absent fraud, the landlord had no duty to repair buildings, to
assure that the premises would be maintained in a safe condition,
or to compensate those who might be injured on the rented prem
ises. 63 This doctrine was known as "caveat emptor" or "buyer be
ware."64
The landlord implicitly warranted that the tenant's quiet en
joyment would be undisturbed for the term of the lease. 65 The
landlord had no right to enter or inspect the premises without the
tenant's permission. 66 Since the landlord never had an opportunity
to discover defective conditions, the common-law perception that a
landlord could not be expected to keep rented premises in repair
was justified.
This system worked well for both parties. In fact, the view of a
lease as a conveyance of property in some circumstances was an ad- .
vantage to a tenant. 67 Although the lessee could not rely on the
lessor for assistance in making repairs, he had what he really
wanted: Land to farm; privacy; and quiet. 68 The typical lessee was
capable of making the repairs necessary to keep his dwelling in a
safe, habitable condition. 69 The tenant did not need, and probably
did not desire, to have the landlord regularly on the premises.
Furthermore, early agrarian tenants often would rent property for
62. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 11221, at 178-79 (1977).
63. Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502,204 N.E.2d 448 (1905). See generally 2
R. POWELL, supra note 62, 11 233, at 330.69. The parties could, if they wished, agree
that the lessor would make all repairs.
64. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 \1ass. 184, 188, 293 N.E.2d 831,
837 (1973).
65. Comment, Judicial Expansioll of Tellallts' Private Law Rights: Implied
Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 489, 490 (1971).
66. "The landlord was IlOt expected to assist in the operation of the land. Quite
the reverse, he was expected to stay as far away as possible." Quinn & Phillips, su
pra note 53, at 228 (emphasis in original).
67. The early common law, in accepting the notion of a lease as a conveyance,
developed the principle that "a real action of ejectment, rather than a contractual ac
tion of debt," could be used to enforce the tenant's legal rights. The action of eject
ment was the preferred method of enforcement. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defec
tive Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIS. L. REV.
19,26.
68. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 226-31.
69. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
de/lied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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long terms or for an entire lifetime. 7o The tenant's long-term inter
est operated as an incentive for him to make repairs since he could
enjoy the fruits of his labor for many years.
The agrarian framework of American society changed as the
nation became industrialized. Urban areas began to emerge, draw
ing people from all parts of the nation as well as from Europe.
Urban growth was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the
rural population.71 Consequently, commercial and residential
leases in urban areas increased in importance. 72 The people who
relocated to these urban centers needed apartments rather than
the quiet enjoyment of a piece of fertile farmland. In return for his
rent the tenant expected a safe, comfortable place to live. The
urban tenant hardly could be called self-sufficient, and "the last
thing he wanted was to be left alone. "73 Apartment and commer
cial buildings were equipped with complex heating, electrical, and
plumbing systems. 74 Surely the vast majority of modem apartment
dwellers could not be expected to have the resources or knowledge
necessary to make repairs on such systems. 75 "Agrarian self reli
ance in this context ... [was] simply not possible. "76
As these economic and social changes altered the landlord
tenant relationship, the courts remained stagnant, adhering to ar
chaic common-law rules and ideas. 77 Various jurisdictions within
the United States began to seek remedies for the resulting injus
tices. Not until the twentieth century did most jurisdictions recog
nize that landlord-tenant law had to be reevaluated in light of the
radical changes which had taken place since colonial times. 78 The

70. 1d. at 1078-79.
71. Love, supra note 67, at 26.
72. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 62, at 180.
73. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 231.
74. ld. See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dellied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
75. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 231-32.
76. ld. at 231.
77. "Since the courts demonstrated no willingness to modify the common law,
it became necessary for the legislatures to take corrective action." Love, supra note
67, at 38.
78. In 1970, Judge Skelly Wright, in his oft-quoted historical analysis of the ob
ligations of landlords, concluded that the time for change had at last arrived.
It is overdue for courts to admit that these assumptions are no longer true
with regard to all urban housing. Today's urban tenants, the vast majority of
whom live in multiple dwelling houses, are interested, not in the land, but
solely in 'a house suitable for occupation.' Furthermore, today's city
dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance
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Massachusetts courts and legislature were slow to respond to the
cry for reform in many areas of landlord-tenant law. 79 Massa
chusetts' strict adherence to the common-law principle that a lease
was a conveyance of an interest in land continued until 1973, when
the principle was invalidated by the supreme judicial court in
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway.8o Only after Hemingway
rejected the archaic conveyance principle did Massachusetts courts
begin to formulate progressive rules and thus embark upon the com
mendable, new trend of decisions in which Yanofsky plays such an
important role. 81
IV.

YANOFSKY AND THE DEMISE OF THE FAILURE

TO REPAIR RULE

In Massachusetts, the old common-law rules of landlord-tenant
law were not challenged until the late nineteenth and early twenti

work; he is unable to make repairs like the 'jack-of-all-trades' farmer who
was the common law's model of the lessee. Further, unlike his agrarian
predecessor who often remained on one piece of land for his entire life,
urban tenants today are more mobile than ever before. A tenant's tenure in a
specific apartment will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs. In
addition, the increasing complexity of today's dwellings renders them much
more difficult to repair than the structures of earlier times. In [sic] a multi
ple dwelling repair may require access to equipment and areas in the con
trol of the landlord. Low and middle income tenants, even if they were in
terested in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for
major repairs since they have no long-term interest in the property.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (footnotes omitted). See also Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Land
lord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 383 (1928).
79. Regarding the landlord's duty to repair common passageways one commen
tator noted, "The Massachusetts court has been more lenient toward the landlord
and has held the tenant more strictly to the maxim caveat emptor." Harkrider, supra
note 78, at 403 n.172.
Regarding situations such as those occurring in Yanofsky, where "land is leased
for a purpose which involves the admission of the public," most states agree that a
landlord must use reasonable care in inspecting and repairing before possession is
transferred. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 403 (4th ed.
1971). "Massachusetts appears to be quite alone to the contrary." ld. at n.40.
Regarding the landlord's liability for nonperformance of his agreement to repair,
a "slowly increasing number of the courts, which ... [had] reached a slight majority
[had] worked out a liability in tort for such injuries to person or property. . . ." ld.
at 409.
For a more complete review of the state of the law in other jurisdictions, see id.
at 399-412.
80. 363 Mass. 184, 197, 293 N .E.2d 831, 841 (1973).
81. See text accompanying notes 150-71 infra.
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eth centuries. 82 These challenges were not successful, however,
until 1973. 83
One of the early rules that insulated lessors from tort liability
was stated in 1887 in Tuttle v. George H. Gilbert Manufacturing
CO.84 Tuttle held that no cause of action in tort existed against a
lessor who breached his agreement to make repairs. 85 In 1919 the
rule was reaffirmed in Fiorntino v. Mason. 86 Plaintiff in Fiorntino
was injured when she fell down a flight of stairs. The landlord had
been notified that the stairs were defective and had made an oral
agreement to repair them when he was notified of the defects. 87
According to the court, failure to comply with such an agreement
gave rise merely to a right of action for breach of contract, where
the damages commonly are only the cost of repairs. 88 The court ad
hered to this rule 89 and found no evidence to support an award of
tort damages under any other theory.90 The rule followed by the
court was based "upon the concept that a lease was to be consid
ered as purely a conveyance of property."91 The lease was con
strued as a conveyance so that the tenant had an exclusive right to
possession and a duty to pay rent, independent of the landlord's
82. See Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283 (1919); Tuttle v.
George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887). See text accompa
nying notes 84-94 infra.
83. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Boston Hous.
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 184, 293 N.E.2d at 831. For a detailed discussion
of Mounsey and Hemingway, see text accompanying notes 150-71 infra. See also
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892), in which the Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court reached a decision recognizing an implied warranty of habita
bility in leases of furnished rooms or furnished houses. The court held that one who
rented a furnished house or room need not tolerate uninhabitable conditions. In
stead, tenants under such circumstances could expect, and rely on the fact, that the
premises would be fit to live in when delivered. The court reasoned that tenants
were contracting for premises fit for immediate use more than for a lease of real es
tate. Caveat emptor, if applied in such a case, would be unjust. Id. at 350,31 N.E. at
286.
84. 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887).
85. ld. at 175, 13 N.E. at 467.
86. 233 Mass. 451, 124 N .E. 283 (1919).
87. At trial the plaintiff was asked: "Q. And then he [landlord] said he would
repair those stairs? A. Yes, 'I [landlord] would repair the stairs, and fix the lower
stairs way up.''' Id. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284.
88. Id. at 453, 124 N.E. at 283.
89. [d. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284.
90. [d. at 456, 124 N.E. at 285.
91. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Yanofsky, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
902,403 N.E.2d at 374; Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 188-89,293
N.E.2d at 837, 840.
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obligation to make repairs. The lessor's duty was to deliver posses
sion to the tenant; he had no right to interfere with the tenant's ex
clusive possessory interest. The landlord could not enter, inspect,
or repair the premises in the tenant's possession without the ten
ant's permission. Thus, because the tenant had a better opportu
nity to repair, the burden for making repairs was placed on him. 92
This reasoning demonstrates how the law favored the landlord's in
terest in the condition of his property over the tenant's right to live
in a safe dwelling. The Fiorntino court held that the landlord had
no duty to keep the premises safe at all times for the tenant. 93 A
duty would exist only if the lessor expressly agreed to keep the
premises not only in repair but also in a safe condition throughout
the term. Such an agreement would place on the landlord the ad
ditional duty to inspect and discover defects. 94 The court termed
such an arrangement "a most onerous undertaking" for the land
lord. 95
Judicial reluctance to impose burdens on the suppliers of
housing continued as the nation grew and modernized and the
need for adequate housing became more acute. In dealing with the
failure to repair rule, which had insulated landlords from tort liabil
ity for damages caused by their failure to repair, Massachusetts
drew a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. If the
tenant could prove that the landlord committed a misfeasance by,
for example, making repairs in fulfillment of an agreement and
doing so in a negligent manner, tort redress was permitted under
ordinary negligence principles. 96 The prevailing judicial attitude ef
fectively discouraged landlords from honoring their repair agree
ments since refusal to make repairs constituted nonfeasance and re
sulted in liability only for the cost of repairs. The reason behind
this distinction was that the lessor, by making repairs, though he
did so negligently, led the lessee to believe that the condition had
92. Harkrider, supra note 78, at 383.
93. 233 Mass. at 456, 124 N.E. at 285.
94. ld. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284.
95. ld. at 453, 124 N.E. at 284.
96. Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 238, 124 N.E. 13, 14 (1919). The court
found that the landlord was not liable. The decision, however, in dicta, did reaffirm
the rule that negligent repair of the balcony railing by the landlord constituted mis
feasance and therefore entitled plaintiffs to recover under a tort theory of liability.
See also Markarian v. Simonian, 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718 (1977) (reaffirming
the misfeasance rule); DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 306 N.E.2d
432 (1974) (landlord found liable in tort when negligent repairs to defective floor
caused floor to collapse and injured plaintiff).
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been corrected. Because the lessee was induced to believe that the
premises were safe, he did not attempt to make repairs himself.
Dangerous conditions, therefore, remained unrepaired. 97 Mas
sachusetts courts also attached heavier liability to misfeasance be
cause in many cases the negligent repairs not only failed to correct
the defect but made the condition worse. 98 For these. reasons the
courts felt that lessors who negligently made repairs were less de
serving of protection from tort liability than lessors who simply did
nothing. In addition, less overt reasons, such as the limited avail
ability of liability insurance, explain the courts' reluctance in early
tort decisions to impose liability on landlords and other business
entrepreneurs. 99
The 1974 decision of DiMarzo v. S.&P. Realty Corp.lOO opened
the door to abolition of the common-law failure to repair rule. The
DiMarzo court stated that the common-law rules would be recon
sidered when the facts of a case warranted it. lOl Such an opportu

97. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 408. See alsp Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass.
477 (1870).
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 411.
99. In many early cases, the courts chose not to render decisions adverse to
landlords in order to avoid decreasing landlords' capital investments. See Lossee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873), which stated:
[Tlhe general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and
possession of my real estate ... are much modified by the exigencies of the
social state ... We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals, and rail
roads .... I take the risk of being accidentally injured in my person without
fault on their part. Most of the rights of property, as well as person, in the
social state, are not absolute but relative and they must be so arranged ... to
promote the general welfare.
Id. at 484. Another explanation for the attitude was that "American judges of the
Nineteenth Century were of a different breed. Many were politicians; all were living
in a new land crying for exploitation; industrialists were often dominant figures in
society; country gentlemen were rarely judges in industrial states." Morris, Hazard
ous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 1175-76 (1952). See
also James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
Furthermore, liability insurance was not as common as it is today. See Tinker,
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance-Perspective and Overview, 25 FED'N
INS. COUNSEL 217, 220 (1975). Thus, the courts were reluctant to saddle those who
provided rental housing with financial burdens that were often far in excess of what
the typical landlord at that time could afford to pay.
100. 364 Mass. 510, 306 N.E.2d 432 (1974). Because the landlord negligently
made repairs, liability was found on the basis of ordinary negligence principles. The
tenant's employee was injured when he fell through a floor weakened by water dam
age. The landlord, in an effort to repair, merely put in a few nails "here and there."
Id. at 512, 306 N.E.2d at 433.
101. Id. at 514, 306 N.E.2d at 434.
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nity arose in Markarian v. Simonian l02 when a lessor was found li
able for the negligent installation of window screens. In that case,
a child was injured when he fell through a screen and out a
window. loa The supreme judicial court, however, refused to over
rule a 1937 case, Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 104
which found no liability when a child fell through a screen and
out a third-floor window. The Markarian decision distinguished
Chelefou on the ground of foreseeability. The screens in Markarian
were installed for the purpose of preventing a child from falling
out l05 while the screens in Chelefou were installed to allow a
breeze to cool the apartment while keeping insects out.106 Because
of this distinction the court allowed the plaintiff in Markarian to
recover while avoiding the need to overrule Chelefou. Thus, the
Chelefou barrier to tort recovery, omission or nonfeasance, sur
vived the Markarian decision. The court would go only so far as to
cast doubt on the validity of Chelefou. 107 The timidity of the
Markarian decision illustrates the way in which the Massachusetts
judiciary sidestepped opportunities to aggressively attack the obso
lete common-law rules. lOS Until 1973, when the modern trend
began in Massachusetts,109 cases commonly were handled like
Markarian: the court, in order to reach fair decisions while leaving
antiquated rules intact, was continuously expending "considerable
energy and [exercising] great ingenuity in attempting to fit various
factual settings into recognized exceptions."l1O Markarian thus left
a degree of uncertainty in its wake regarding the future existence
of the common-law failure to repair rule in Massachusetts.
Poirier v. Town of Plymouth 111 hinted at an answer by abol
ishing the "hidden defect" barrier to recovery.112 This barrier,
102. 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718 (1977).
103. Id. at 672, 369 N.E.2d at 720.
104. 297 Mass. at 236, 8 N.E.2d at 769.
105. 373 Mass. at 675, 369 N.E.2d at 722.
106. 297 Mass. at 236, 8 N.E.2d at 769.
107. 373 Mass. at 675, 369 N.E.2d at 722.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Reporter's Note to Introductory
Note, ch. 17, at 157 (1977).
109. See note 150 infra and accompanying text.
llO. See note 108 supra.
llI. 374 Mass. 206, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978). The court set down a standard of
reasonable care for an employer to adhere to in insuring that his property would be
safe.
ll2. See Note, Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, The Hidden Defect Rule, and New
Patterns of Tort Law Reform in Massachusetts, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 537 (1979).

1980]

LANDLORD-TENANT LAW

367

commonly referred to as the hidden defect rule, had placed a
heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs to show that their injuries were
caused by a hidden defect on a landowner's property which the
landlord knew about or should have discovered. 113 If the lessor
failed to rebut the plaintiffs allegations by proving that the hidden
defect was not readily discoverable, the lessee could recover. 114
proof that the defect was not discoverable served as an affirmative
defense for the landlord. 115 The Poirier court abolished the hidden
defect rule and substituted a "standard of ordinary care under all
circumstances. "116
Although Poirier dealt with the relation between a landowner
employer and his employee, one Massachusetts jurist has opined
that the Poirier holding is readily applicable to landlord-tenant
law. 117 Massachusetts Court of Appeals Justice John M. Greaney
stated that the now obsolete distinction between patent and latent
defects inherent in the hidden defects rule could be eliminated as
a discredited "status" distinction, just as the status distinction be
tween licensees and invitees has been abolished. In 1978, Mounsey
v. Ellard 118 held that the status distinction between invitees and li
censees, which resulted in imposition of different standards of care
on landlords, prevented juries from "ever determining the fun
damental question whether the defendant has acted reasonably."119
Because of this, the court found that such a status distinction was
no longer valid. Justice Greaney reasoned from the Mounsey case
that a standard of reasonable care should apply to a landlord as
well as to a landowner-employer. He also predicted that the next
appropriate case would be decided under the reasonable care stan
dard. 120
In 1980 the uncertainty created by Markarian and partially re
solved by Poirier, as to !10W far the pro-tenant trend of Massa
chusetts decisions would extend, was conclusively eliminated. The
113. ld. at 540.
114. ld.
115. ld.
U6. ld. at 539.
117. Greaney, Developing Duties of a Landlord with Regard to Tenant Safety,
63 MASS. L. REV. 61, 66 (1978).
118. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). For a full explanation of the
Mounsey rationale and the visitor status distinctions, see notes 156-67 infra and ac
companying text.
119. 363 Mass. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 44.
120. Greaney, supra note 117, at 66.
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in the unprecedented case
of Young v. Garwacki,121 held a landlord liable in tort for failing to
repair a defective balcony railing. 122 The landlord was held liable
for injuries sustained by Young, a third party visiting the building,
as a result of her fall through a defective balcony railing. The land
lord, La Freniere, had been on notice that the defect existed. No
express agreement, however, bound the landlord to make re
pairs. 123 The Young court held that the landlord had not used rea
sonable care in maintaining the premises in a safe condition even
though the landlord had not agreed to make repairs. Thus, an im
plied agreement to repair the premises existed. 124 By finding such
an implied agreement and by holding the landlord liable in tort for
failing to make repairs, the misfeasance-nonfeasance element of the
failure to repair rule was all but abolished. Prior to Young, a find
ing of nonfeasance made a lessor liable only for the cost of repairs;
the Young court, however, found the lessor liable in tort. Thus,
common tort damages encompassing such things as medical ex
penses, lost wages, and pain and suffering were available. The
decision went on to abolish the "control" distinction which previ
ously had barred recovery. 125 The control distinction provided that
a landlord had no duty to repair those parts of the premises under
the tenant's control. The areas of rental property not demised ex
clusively to a tenant were considered the only areas that the lessor
was responsible for repairing, if in fact a duty to repair existed at
all. In Young the defective railing was part of the premises de
mised to the tenant and therefore was under the tenant's con
trol. 126 Finding the landlord liable for failing to repair this railing
effectively abolished the control distinction as a potential bar to
tort redress.
A weak argument could be made that Young did not abolish
the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction within the failure to repair
rule in light of the fact that the rule's requirement of an express

121. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729,402 N.E.2d 1045.
122. ld.
123. The landlord, however, testified that he considered it his obligation to re
pair the railing. ld. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046. The tenant, Garwacki, had been
found liable for the plaintiff Young's injuries in a previous suit. The tenant, however,
had not appealed the decision nor had he sought indemnification from his landlord.
124. For a full discussion of Young, see notes 134-41 infra and accompanying
text.
125. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
126. ld. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046.
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agreement to repair had not been met. No express agreement
to repair existed in Young. Although past decisions, such as
Markarian,127 had relied on questionable distinctions in order to
avoid overruling prior cases, the distinction between express and
implied agreements cannot be used to limit a tenant's tort recov
ery. The Young court held that a duty to repair exists regardless of
the presence of an express agreement to repair. Therefore, no dis
tinction can be drawn between express and implied agreements.
The legal consequences of a landlord's breach of his duty should
not depend on the presence or absence of an express agreement to
repair. In Yanofsky, however, an express agreement to repair the
roof did exist. The landlord, after receiving notice and reasonable
time to repair, failed to make such repairs and was held liable in
tort. The Yanofsky and Young decisions thus put an end to the
continuing validity, however eroded, of decisions such as Chelefou
and Fiorntino which supported the validity of the nonfeasance bar
to tort recovery inherent in the failure to repair rule. The supreme
judicial court, in imposing increased responsibility on the party
best able to prevent the injury, continued the trend toward recog
nition and enforcement of tenants' rights. The court accomplished
this by allowing an action in tort against the landlord when he was
alleged to be guilty of nonfeasance, contrary to the old common
law rule.
V. YOUNG AND ABOLITION OF THE RULE THAT
No AGREEMENT TO REPAIR WILL BE IMPLIED BY
A MERE LEASING OF PREMISES

Another rule strictly adhered to at common law was that no
agreement to repair would be implied by a mere leasing of prem
ises. 128 The absence of an agreement to repair was a bar to recov
ery in all but one situation. When a landlord gratuitously made re
pairs, the Massachusetts courts allowed an injured plaintiff to
recover in tort if gross negligence could be proven. 129 The rule was
reaffirmed in 1972 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Popowych v. PoorvU. 130 The decision reiterated the principle that,
in the absence of an agreement to repair, the lessors were under

127. 373 Mass. at 669, 369 N.E.2d at 718. See notes 102-10 supra and accompa
nying text.
128. Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 124 N.E. 74 (1919).
129. Id. at 398, 124 N.E. at 84.
130. 361 Mass. 848, 279 N.E.2d 705 (1972).
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no affirmative duty to make repairs to a window. If they chose to
do so gratuitously, they would be liable for injury only if the plain
tiff could prove gross negligence on the part of the repairmen hired
by the lessor.131 During trial it was revealed that the lessor's re
pairmen had left debris on the floor after they began to fix the
window. Plaintiff, Popowych, a third party, fell on a round, hard
object. 132 Since the repairmen's actions did not constitute gross
negligence, plaintiff was foreclosed from recovering. 133
In Young v. Garwacki 134 plaintiff, who was injured by falling
through a defective balcony railing, alleged two counts of negli
gence. The trial court judge, while noting that the accident
occurred on a part of the premises demised to the tenant and sup
posedly under his control, rejected the control distinction. The
jury was instructed "to assume that there was an implied duty
imposed on the landlord to exercise reasonable care to maintain
the rental premises in a reasonably safe condition. "135 In affirming
the lower court's decision, the supreme judicial court commended
the trial judge for his foresight in giving such an instruction in view
of the fact that prior to Young redress was not allowed for injuries
incurred as a result of defects in parts of the premises under the
tenant's control. 136
Young found that a duty to repair was implicit in the leasing of
the premises even without an express agreement to repair. By
finding the landlord liable for injuries resulting from his failure to
repair when no express agreement to repair existed, the Massa
chusetts judiciary, for the first time, found such an agreement to
be implied from the leasing arrangement. The court went even fur
ther by including within the lessor's duty to repair the requirement
that he use reasonable care to insure that the parts of the premises
demised to the tenant, and under the tenant's control, be main
tained in a safe condition. Distinctions such as control, based on
outdated rules, were said to do nothing more than discourage re
pairs on rented premises since landlords under that principle had
no incentive to repair and tenants with short-term leases often
lacked the desire, knowledge, and resources to do SO.137 The
131. [d. at 849, 279 N.E.2d at 706. See also text accompanying note 8 supra.
132. 361 Mass. at 848, 279 N.E.2d at 706.
133. [d. at 848-49, 279 N.E.2d at 706.
134. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729, 402 N.E.2d at 1045.
135. [d. at 731 n.1, 402 N.E.2d at 1046 n.1 (emphasis added).
136. [d.
137. [d. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
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Young court hoped to encourage necessary repairs and thus to
eliminate potential traps to unwary third parties such as Ms.
Young. 138 The Young decision signifies a new standard for lessors:
their conduct is to be measured under all circumstances by a
standard of reasonableness rather than by archaic common-law
rules and doctrines. 139
The extent to which landlords are chargeable with knowledge
was not determined in Young. 140 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court Justice Liacos, however, made it clear that a landlord "should
not be liable in negligence unless he knew or reasonably should
have known of the defect and had a reasonable opportunity to re
pair it. "141 Young, which focused on residential leases, left the
following questions open with regard to commercial leases: 142
Whether an agreement to repair will be implied in a commercial,
as opposed to a residential, lease arrangement; whether the control
distinction will maintain its validity in a commercial setting; and,
taking the possibilities to the extreme, whether a landlord may be
held liable to a commercial tenant for injuries sustained as a result
of defects on parts of the rental premises within the tenant's con
trol in the absence of an express agreement to repair. These issues
will be discussed in the context of the Yanofsky decision.
The facts of the Yanofsky case did not permit the court to de
cide these questions since Yanofsky involved a defect in an area
which the landlord had expressly agreed to repair.143 Yanofsky, in
implying an agreement to indemnify from an express agreement to
repair, extended complete financial protection to tenants who oth
erwise would be liable to third persons injured as a result of unsafe
138. Id. at 735-36, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
139. Seven years ago, in Sa ..gent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397-398, 308 A.2d
528, 534 (1973), Chief Justice Kenison wrote: "Henceforth, landlords as
other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an un
reasonable risk of harm. A landlord must act as a reasonable person under
all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or
avoiding the risk. We think this basic principle of responsibility for land
lords as for others 'best expresses the principles of justice and reasonable
ness upon which our law of torts is founded' (citations omitted). Henceforth,
this basic principle of responsibility applies to Massachusetts landlords as
well.
Id. at 736, 402 N.E.2d at 1049.
140. Id. at 737 n.8, 402 N.E.2d at 1050 n.8.
141. Id. at 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1050.
142. "We do not decide whether our rule today should extend to nonresidential
properties." Id. at 738 n.12, 402 N.E.2d at 1051 n.12.
143. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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conditions on premises which the landlord expressly agreed to re
pair. 144 This note will examine several issues raised when
Yanofsky's implications are considered: Whether an agreement to
indemnifY will be implied from an express agreement to make re
pairs in a residential leasehold situation;145 whether an indemnifi
cation agreement will be implied in a residential context in the ab
sence of an express agreement to repair;146 whether an agreement
to repair will be implied in a commercial lease;147 and whether an
agreement to indemnify will be implied in a commercial leasehold
setting where no express agreement to repair exists. 148 Only by ex
amining the current trend in Massachusetts regarding landlord- .
tenant tort law can one attempt to forecast the answers to these
questions.
VI.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS

LANDLORD-TENANT

LAw PRIOR TO YANOFSKY

The year 1973 was critical in Massachusetts landlord-tenant
law. By implying a warranty of· habitability149 in all residential
leases, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Boston Hous
ing Authority v. Hemingway, 150 recognized that modern residential
tenants are entitled to safe and humane living conditions. The
Hemingway court extended the Ingalls v. Hobbs 151 holding,
which implied the warranty only to furnished dwellings, by making
the warranty applicable to all premises used primarily as dwell
ings. 152 In addition, Hemingway abolished the rule that a tenant's
covenant to pay rent was independent of the landlord's obligation
to provide the premises. 153 The independent covenants rule was
deemed obsolete since it was premised on the outdated idea that a
lease was a conveyance of property.l54 In so holding, another of
144. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374.
145. See text accompanying notes 172-79 infra.
146. See text accompanying notes 180-91 infra.
147. See text accompanying notes 194-209 infra.
148. See text accompanying notes 194-213 infra.
149. Formerly, a warranty of habitability was implied only when a building
was rented for the purpose of serving as a dwelling to the lessee. The warrranty of
habitability serves as a guarantee that the premises are in a habitable condition and
fit for use and occupation. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
150. 363 Mass. at 184,293 N.E.2d at 831.
151. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). See the discussion of Ingalls in note 83
supra.
152. 363 \1ass. at 196-97,293 N.E.2d at 841.
153. Id. at 198,293 N.E.2d 842.
154. Id. See also note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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the tenant's common-law burdens fell. Caveat emptor155 was again
seen as inconsistent with contemporary societal needs.
Mounsey v. Ellard 156 was also decided in 1973. In that case a
police officer who slipped and was injured on defendant landown
er's property was allowed to recover on a negligence theory. 157
Prior to Mounsey, firemen and police officers were considered to
be licensees, a subcategory of the common-law visitor class. 15s A li
censee is someone who enters upon another's land with the occupi
er's consent for his own purposes and not for the owner's bene
fit. 159 An invitee, on the other hand, is one who enters the occu
pier's premises at the occupier's invitation to conduct business
which concerns the occupier. 160 The invitee is "placed on a higher
footing than a licensee."161 To be included in this more protected
category, a visitor had to confer a benefit upon the occupier in the
performance of something in which the latter had an interest, pro
vided the benefit was other than "'those intangible advantages
arising from mere social intercourse.' "162 Before Mounsey, a licen
see had to prove reckless or willful and wanton conduct in order to
recover.163 The court, in refusing to further honor the licensee
versus invitee status distinction and in adopting one duty of reason
able care for all landowners and occupiers, removed another bur
den from the shoulders of injured plaintiffs. The Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court, in the words of Chief Justice Tauro, refused
to follow the "ancient and largely discredited common law distinc
tion" between invitees and licensees because the "status question
often prevents the jury from ever determining the fundamental
question whether the defendant has acted reasonably in light of all
the circumstances in the particular case."164 Although Mounsey
dealt with a landowner-defendant, the court expressly applied its
holding to land occupiers as well. 165 The Mounsey decision ex

155. For a discussion of caveat emptor, see text accompanying notes 63 & 64
supra.
156. 363 Mass. at 693, 297 N.E.2d at 43.
157. ld.
158. ld. at 694-95, 297 N.E.2d at 44.
159. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 376.
160. ld. at 385.
16l. ld.
162. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. at 705, 297 N.E.2d at 50 (quoting Taylor v.
Goldstein, 329 Mass. 161, 165, 107 N.E.2d 14, 16 (1952)).
163. ld. at 694,297 N.E.2d at 44.
164. ld. at 706-07, 297 N.E.2d at 51 (footnote omitted).
165. ld.
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pressly abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees
and imposed a single duty of reasonable care on all land
owners and occupiers with regard to anyone legally on their prem
ises. 166 This rule parallels the intent of chapter 186, section 19 of
the Massachusetts General Laws: 167 a lessor must exercise reason
able care to correct unsafe conditions on rental property.
The reasonableness standard, espoused in Mounsey, carried
through much of the subsequent Massachusetts case law dealing
with the landlord's duty to maintain leased premises in a safe con
dition. Prior to Mounsey, Hemingway effectively extinguished the
validity of the common-law view of a lease as a conveyance of an
interest in land by holding that landlords have a duty to provide
tenants with habitable dwellings. By accepting the modern view,
that a lease is essentially a contractual exchange of covenants,
Hemingway lent support to the Mounsey rationale that the crucial
question when tort issues arise in the landlord-tenant context is the
reasonableness of the landlord's conduct. These two decisions were
the first in a line of cases that radically changed the obligations of
landlords.
Four years later the supreme judicial court extended the rea
sonableness standard of Mounsey. Two decisions eliminated yet an
other common-law bar to recovery. In King v. G & M Realty
COrp.,168 a tenant's guest was allowed tort redress upon proving
that the stairway where her accident occurred had been negligently
maintained. In a similar case, Lindsey v. Massios,169 the court al
lowed a tenant who was injured on an unlit stairway to recover.
These decisions imposed a reasonableness standard on the landlord
regardless of who was injured as long as it was foreseeable that the
victim would be on the premises. The landlord's defense in relying
on the status distinction between a tenant and a tenant's guest was
readily defeated by application of the Mounsey rationale. Extension
of the Mounsey reasonableness standard to abolish the distinction
between tenant and guest, a development which allowed both the
166. Id. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 51. The court did, however, assert that a lesser
duty existed with regard to trespassers. ld. at 707 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51 n.7. See also
Kermatec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (citing Mounsey v.
Ellard, 363 Mass. at 703-04, 708, 297 N.E.2d at 49, 52). The Court in Kermarec re
fused to recognize the licensee-invitee distinction in maritime law.
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). See note 45 supra and
accompanying text.
168. 373 Mass. 658,370 N.E.2d 413 (1977).
169. 372 Mass. 79,360 N.E.2d 631 (1977).
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King and Lindsey plaintiffs to recover, signifies the court's growing
acceptance of the policies which demand the imposition of a
greater standard of care on landlords. 170 With Hemingway's attack
on caveat emptor, Mounsey's abolition of the common-law licensee
invitee status distinction, and the extension of Mounsey in King
and Lindsey to abolish the tenant-guest distinction, the Mas
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clearly sounded the warning: ca
veat lessor, or lessor beware. The Commonwealth had begun to
align itself with the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions. 171 The
Yanofsky ruling, allowing indemnification of a lessee by a lessor in
a commercial lease, exemplifies the modem Massachusetts view of
the landlord-tenant relationship. It is characteristic of the trend
which began in 1973.
VII.

AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED IN RESIDENTIAL

LEASES CONTAINING EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO REPAIR

The initial question left open by Yanofsky is whether an agree
ment to indemnifY will be implied from an express agreement to
repair in a residential leasehold relationship. This question must be
answered affirmatively. In Yanofsky, the supreme judicial court
adopted the reasoning of the Restatement (Second) of Property. 172
The court's decision to hold the landlord liable was based on a
number of persuasive factors set forth in the Restatement: The land
lord contractually undertook to make repairs; the tenant justifiably
relied on the landlord to make the repairs, thereby foregoing such
efforts himself; and the landlord had a reversionary interest in the
premises, providing him with incentive to keep his property in re
pair. 173 The Restatement sections reli~d on in Yanofsky, however,
do not mention indemnification.
170. See text accompanying notes 150-69 supra; text accompanying note 171
infra.
171. See note 79 supra. See also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972), an Illinois case abolishing the independent covenants rule, in
which the court used Justice Cardozo's definition of the judiciary's obligations re
garding obsolete common law rules: "A rule which in its origin was the creation of
the courts themselves, and was supposed in the making to express the mores of the
day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation
of the rule would do violence to the social conscience." ld. at 367, 280 N.E.2d at 217
(quoting B. CARDOZO, THE GROWfH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924» (emphasis in origi
nal).
172. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 903, 403 N.E.2d at 374; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY §§ 17.4, 17.5 (1977).
173. ld. § 17.5, comment b (1)-(3).
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Forcing a landlord to pay for his breach of an express agree
ment to repair also is supported by recent case law. It is widely ac
cepted that, although modem residential tenants justifiably expect
their apartments to be safe and habitable, most lack the knowl
edge, financial resources, incentive, and ability to make repairs
themselves. 174 In addition, the residential landlord is usually in the
best position to distribute the cost of compensating injured plain
tiffs.175 The Yanofsky court felt that the justifications for holding a
landlord liable for physical harm caused by a breach of his express
agreement to repair also should protect innocent tenants from hav
ing to bear the cost of such compensation. Implying an agreement
to indemnify is firmly supported by notions of fairness as well as by
the Restatement's rationale for holding the landlord liable when he
has breached his express agreement to repair. The Restatement's
reasoning is equally, if not more, applicable to situations involving
residential leases.
Residential tenants have even less opportunity and incentive
to make repairs than commercial tenants. 176 A tenant who leases
defective premises is often in possession for a short term, usually
has little money, and probably does not know how to make re
pairs. 177 Neither the Restatement nor tort principles draw a dis
tinction between commercial and residential leases. The Young de
cision, by implying an agreement to repair from a residential lease,
placed increased responsibility on landlords who lease residential
property.178 The Mounsey decision and chapter 186, section 19 of
the Massachusetts General Laws impose a duty of reasonable care
on landlords to ensure the safety of their property.179 These hold
ings, in conjunction with the social policies which inspired the
post-1973 movement to make tort recovery more available to ten

174. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cerl.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally Harkrider, supra note 78, at 383.
175. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 494. See also Pound, The End of Law as
Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195,233 (1914); note 189
infra.
176. See generally Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 225. See also RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, Comment a (1965); text accompanying notes 73-76
supra.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, Comment a (1965); text ac
companying notes 73-76 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 121-25 supra.
179. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). For the text of this stat
ute, see note 45 supra.
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ants, appear to encourage extension of Yanofsky to residential
leaseholds involving express agreements to repair.
In Yanofsky the supreme judicial court found that the landlord
breached his duty to repair. This breach was found to be the
foreseeable cause of a victim's injury. Inherent in the decision to
imply an agreement to indemnify is the notion that when a land
lord causes an injury, he alone should be responsible for com
pensating the victim. This reasoning should be equally applicable
to residential tenants in order to protect them from financial loss.

VIII.

AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED IN A RESIDENTIAL
LEASE WITH AN IMPLIED AGREEMENT TO REPAIR

A somewhat more difficult question is presented when the
agreement to repair is implied rather than expressed in a residen
tial lease. The Young decision, in applying a reasonableness
standard, held that a landlord's duty to repair is implicit in the
mere leasing of residential property.180 The court also abolished
the control distinction as a bar to recovery .181 Thus, in a residen
tial context, it does not matter whether the defect was located in a
leased or common area as long as the landlord had notice of the
defect and had time to repair it. It appears, therefore, that the su
preme judicial court will find a duty to repair whether expressed or
implied in all residential leases. Whether an implied agreement to
indemnify a tenant for money paid to third parties in settlement of
injury claims can be derived from an implied agreement to repair
is another question.
On its face, language appearing in the Yanofsky opinion might
discourage extension of indemnification in the context of implied
agreements to repair. Justice Quirico stated: "such an agreement
to indemnify may be implied as a matter of law from an agreement
to repair, contained in the express terms of a lease. "182 Since
Yanofsky involved a commercial lease containing an express agree
ment to repair, Justice Quirico dealt specifically with express
agreements. Even though the Yanofsky decision focused on express
agreements, the logical extension of the principles espoused in re
cent Massachusetts cases indicates that an agreement to indemnify

180.
181.
notes 125
182.

1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046.
[d. Abolition of the control distinction is discussed in text accompanying
& 126 supra.
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 375 (emphasis added).
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will be implied when a duty to repair has been found in the ab
sence of an express agreement.
Analysis of the Young and Yanofsky decisions' treatment of the
Restatement supports indemnification. The comments accompa
nying section 17.5 of the Restatement state that the rule holding a
landlord liable in tort for failing to honor his contractual promise to
repair applies only to express agreements to repair. 183 Young
clearly rejected the requirement that an express agreement to re
pair must exist in order for an injured victim to recover in tort
against a landlord. It necessarily follows that the supreme judicial
court found the Restatement requirement of an express agreement
to be obsolete. The supreme judicial court in Yanofsky, therefore,
in relying on the Restatement rationale to imply an agreement to
indemnify, could not have been referring to the Restatement's
discussion of express agreements in the lease but rather to the Re
statement's reasoning that the party causing the plaintiff's injuries
should bear the cost of compensation. When the breach of a duty
to repair causes the plaintiff's injuries, whether the duty arose
from an express or an implied agreement should be irrelevant. If
the supreme judicial court is to remain consistent with the policies
developed since 1973 in Massachusetts and with its adoption of the
Restatement rationale in Yanofsky, as modified by the Young deci
sion, the court will have to allow an agreement to indemnify to be
implied in a residential lease regardless of the existence of an ex
press agreement to make repairs. It is clear that the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has extended its protection of tenants and
their guests far beyond the Restatement's rules.
Requiring an express agreement to repair as a prerequisite to
indemnification may make sense in a commercial relationship, 184
but a different result is clearly warranted in a residential context.
The policies behind protection of innocent tenants and third par
ties, now widely recognized by the courts, encourage indemnifica
tion for both economic and physical harm. 185 The supreme judicial
court has frequently reached decisions consistent with these poli
cies. 18S The Yanofsky decision focused on the fact that the landlord
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.5, comment b(l) (1977).
184. An analysis of the distinction between commercial and residential leases
appears in text accompanying notes 196-208 infra.
185. These policies are discussed in text accompanying notes 150-71 supra.
186. Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729, 402 N.E.2d at 1045;
Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256; Lindsey v.
Massios,372 Mass. 79,360 N.E.2d 631 (1977); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. at 693,
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caused Mrs. Vahey's injuries by breaching his duty to repair. He
alone, therefore, was held responsible for bearing the cost of
compensating her.187 A landlord has no less a duty to make repairs
when the agreement to repair is implied rather than expressed.
The law is concerned with protecting innocent tenants and guests.
The supreme judicial court stated that;
it [is] clear, moreover, that a lessee such as A & P that is "in
jured" by virtue of being reasonably obliged to settle a claim for
personal injuries which were caused by the lessor's failure to re
pair an unsafe condition within a reasonable time, would have a
cause of action against the lessor under the statute to recover
such amounts reasonably paid. ISS

In insulating the innocent tenant from economic harm by forcing
the negligent landlord to indemnifY him, financial responsibility for
injuries suffered as a result of unsafe rental premises is placed
upon the lessor. Liability, as espoused in modem tort theory,
should rest on the "party best able to bear [the risk], and most
likely to prevent the injuries. "189 The availability of liability insur
ance, the landlord's stronger bargaining position, and his greater
ability to spread the costs of compensation all indicate that he is in
the best position to pay damages incurred as a result of the breach
of his duty to repair.
The Young decision's dismissal of the distinction between im
plied and express agreements to repair, as they impact upon the
landlord's liability, should be sufficient to prevent a hindlord from

297 N.E.2d at 43; Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 184,293 N.E.2d
at 831.
187. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374.
188. Id. (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977) to insu
late tenants from economic harm caused by the landlord's breach of his duty to re
pair) (emphasis added).
189. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 410. See also Dean v. Hershowitz, 119
Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56
MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (1958). Professor Cooperrider's reaction to F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) was that the basic principles oftort law "can be
summarized in two slogans, 'Let All Victims Be Compensated,' and 'Let the Loss Be
Spread: .. See also Pound, supra note 175, at 233.
W. PROSSER, supra note 79, supports Cooperrider's proposition:
There is 'a strong and growing tendency, where there is blame on neither
side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the
loss and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where there has been no
fault: An entire field of legislation, illustrated by the workmen's compensa
tion acts, has been based upon the same principle.
Id. at 494.
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using lack of an express agreement to repair as a bar to a tenant's
action for indemnification. Failure to remove this potential bar to
recovery would be tantamount to finding the landlord at fault and
responsible for a third party's injuries while holding the tenant lia
ble for compensating the victim merely because the agreement to
repair was implied rather than express. The Young court abolished
the distinction in the repair context; to revive it in the indemnifica
tion context would be inconsistent and indefensible. If a duty to re
pair exists, then the reasons for allowing indemnification of the ten
ant also exist. Whether the landlord's duty was implied or express
should not be relevant.
Little resistance to imposing increased responsibility onto
landlords remains in Massachusetts. Stricter standards have been
applied to landlords' actions as the ancient common-law rules have
been rejected. 190 The stage has been set for realization of the logi
cal and reasonable consequences of the Yanofsky decision. An
agreement to indemnifY must be implied from any agreement, ex
press or implied, to make repairs. Such a result would further the
important social policy of compensating innocent victims quickly
and efficiently by placing the burden of compensation on the party
who is responsible for the hazard, who can best prevent such acci
dents, and who can best distribute the cost. 191
IX.

AGREEMENT TO REPAIR IMPLIED IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE

Whether an agreement to repair will be implied in a commer
cial lease will be determined by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court's view as to the validity of the distinctions often drawn
between commercial and residential leases. The court in Young,
relying on both the legislative intent underlying chapter 186, sec
tion 19 of the Massachusetts General Laws 192 and the recent trend
of decisions in Massachusetts, implied an agreement to repair in a
residential lease. 193 The court did not decide whether the holding
applied to nonresidential property.194 Extension to commercial
premises, however, was not expressly precluded.
190. See text accompanying notes 149-71 supra for a discussion of the demise
of these common-law rules in Massachusetts.
191. See W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 494; Cooperrider, supra note 189, at
1299.
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977).
193. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729,402 N.E.2d 1045. The Young holding is dis
cussed in text accompanying notes 121-25 supra.
194. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 738 n.12, 402 N.E.2d at 1051 n.12.
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The two kinds of leases frequently are distinguished on the ba
sis of the compelling needs of residential tenants. The view of a
"dwelling as a necessity of life" and the social consequences of
poor housing have led courts to provide greater protection to resi
dential tenants. 195 These factors are not present when a building is
leased for commercial reasons. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the Restatement (Second) of Property, however, have been in
terpreted as making no distinction between residential and com
mercial leases. 196 As new rules regarding landlord-tenant tort law
are adopted, the various policy considerations relevant to commer
cial and residential leases will continue to be debated. 197
Before 1959, the Massachusetts judiciary gave little indication
about its stance on the distinction to be made between residential
and commercial leases. In 1959, however, the supreme judicial
court, for the first time, allowed a commercial tenant to recover for
damages arising from the landlord's failure to maintain and repair
the premises. 198 This decision was reached at a time when dam
ages allowable for such a "nonfeasance" breach were limited to the
cost of repairs. The liberal damages award, coupled with the recent
trend of decisions in Massachusetts, indicates judicial concern for
the protection of commercial tenants.
An analysis of the recent enactments of the Massachusetts leg
islature lends support to the contention that a distinction between
residential and commercial leases is unwarranted. In 1972, the
Massachusetts legislature enacted chapter 186, sections 19199 and
195. See Note, Commercial Versus Residential Leases: A New Double
Standard?, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 901, 907 (1974). See also Berzito v. Gambino, 119 N.J.
Super. 332, 291 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1972).
196. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 312, 258 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1977).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.2, 5.4 (Landlord & Tenant
Discussion Draft, 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965).
197. Whether judges presume that landlords are generally in a superior bar
gaining position is a matter of considerable debate. For decisions supporting the
view that commercial tenants maintain a stronger bargaining position than residential
tenants, see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, III Cal. Rptr.
704 (1974); Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. The Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. 1973);
Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652 (1975); Midland Carpet Corp. v.
Franklin Assoc. Properties, 90 N.J. Super. 42, 216 A.2d 231 (App. Div. 1966); Gabl v.
Alaska Loan & Inv. Co., 6 Wash. App. 880, 496 P.2d 548 (1972). Contra, Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 258 N.W.2d 30 (1977); College Mobile Home Park &
Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976).
198. See Note, supra note 195, at 905-06 (discussing Charles E. Burt, Inc. v.
Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959)).
199. For the text of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977), see note
45 supra.
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15. 200 Section 19 deals with the landlord's duty to exercise reason
able care in repairing defects. Section 15 prevents the landlord
from exculpating himself from liability. The legislature drew no dis
tinction between residential and commercial landlords in either
section. In section 19 the legislature speCifically carved out an ex
ception for owner-occupied, two- or three-family dwellings201 yet
was silent as to commercial property. Had the legislature intended
to limit section 19 to residential leases, it would have done so with
clear language to that effect, as it had done regarding lessors of
two- or three-family dwellings. 202 The same argument is applicable
to the language in chapter 186, section 15, which speaks of leases
only as they relate to "real property."203 That language does not
distinguish between residential and commercial landlords either.
The language chosen by the legislature, therefore, can be inter
preted to impose a reasonableness standard on commercial as well
as residential landlords.
A reason often given for a legal distinction between residential
and commercial landlords is that commercial tenants maintain a
stronger bargaining position than residential tenants. 204 The ab
sence of an agreement to repair might imply that the parties, in
negotiating the lease, for whatever reason, decided not to include
an agreement by the landlord to repair. This freedom of contract
argument can be explored only with an understanding of the pur
poses of liability. The law is concerned with injuries to unsus
pecting third parties as well as to tenants. The courts, in order to
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15 (West 1977) states that:
Any provision of a lease or other rental agreement relating to real prop
erty whereby a lessee or tenant enters into a covenant, agreement or con
tract, by the use of any words whatsoever, the effect of which is to indem
nify the lessor or landlord or hold the lessor or landlord harmless, or
preclude or exonerate the lessor or landlord from any or all liability to the
lessee or tenant, or to any other person, for any injury, loss, damage or liabil
ity arising from any omission, fault, negligence or other misconduct of the
lessor or landlord on or about the leased or rented premises or on or about
any elevators, stairways, hallways or other appurtenance used in connection
therewith, shall be deemed to be against public policy and void.
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). See note 45 supra for
the full text of the statute.
202. The Michigan Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306,
312, 258 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1977), makes a similar argument, citing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965), which also recognizes no distinction between resi
dential and commercial leases with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship.
203. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15 (West 1977). For the full text of § 15,
see note 200 supra.
204. See note 197 supra.
200.
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protect these parties, will continue to attach liability to those who
are responsible for the defective conditions causing injury and who
are in the best position to make repairs. 205 This principle of deter
rence is deeply ingrained in judicial thought. Even when many of
the now defunct common-law rules still were followed, an excep
tion to the rule exempting landlords from liability existed when the
property was leased for a purpose requiring admission of the pub
lic. Basically, the exception was founded on the idea that a land
lord's duty to the public was so great that shifting liability to the
tenant in certain situations was forbidden. 206 A second exception
prevented landlords from using their property in such a way as to
create a public nuisance. 207 This second exception applied only to
conditions existing prior to possession by the commercial tenant, 208
yet it embodied the policy of expanding a landlord's duty to repair
leased property when the public was to be admitted.
The freedom of contract argument, often used to support a ju
dicial hands-off policy regarding commercial leases, was dealt a se
vere blow by Yanofsky. It is clear that the tenant, A & P, was in at
least an equal bargaining position with the lessor. 209 The lease,
while expressing an agreement to repair, conspicuously omitted an
agreement to indemnifY. The traditional freedom of contract ratio
nale would suggest that the absence of such an agreement was in
tended by the parties, who surely must have known of the exis
tence of such a device. Regardless of the existence of equal bar
gaining positions, the supreme judicial court felt it necessary to ex
tend complete financial protection to the commercial tenant by
implying an agreement to indemnifY. The Yanofsky decision repre
sents the latest step in the trend of decisions emphasizing tenants'
rights, regardless of the commercial or residential nature of the
lease. The demise of the commercial versus residential distinction
is even clearer when chapter 186, section 19 is construed to mean
that commercial as well as residential landlords should be held to a
reasonable standard of care, regardless of the existence of an ex

205. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cerl.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also Harkrider, supra note 78, at 383.
206. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 403-04.
207. ld. at 404.
208. ld. at 405.
209. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Corp. reported $24.2 million income
before taxes, $13.8 million net income, $667.1 million total current assets, $423.8
million total current liabilities, and $243.3 million net working capital as of February
26, 1977. [1980] 3 Moody's Investors Service, No. 62, § 24 (Aug. 4, 1980).
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press agreement to make repairs. The supreme judicial court, in
Yotlng, decided that such an express agreement was unnecessary in
a residential lease. Implying an agreement to repair in a commer
cial lease would be consistent with prior case law, legislative in
tent, and social policy.

X.

AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED FROM

AN IMPLIED AGREEMENT TO REPAIR IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE

Assuming that an agreement to repair may be implied in a
commercial lease, it is necessary to consider whether an agreement
to indemnify may be implied as well. The same policies favoring an
implied agreement to repair support implying an agreement to in
demnify, even absent an express agreement to repair. Should the
court imply a duty to repair, the manner in which the duty arises
should be irrelevant. 21o Extension of the duty to repair would be
the logical result if the Massachusetts judiciary were to continue
applying social policies as it has in its recent decisions. 211 Deciding
that the commercial landlord has a duty to repair, regardless of the
existence of an express agreement to that effect, would be consist
ent with the legislature's intent as well as with the court's commit
ment to protecting tenants and unwary third parties. 212 The deci
sion would reaffirm this commitment by placing the responsibility
for physical injuries caused by unsafe conditions existing on any
rented property upon the landlord who, when given notice and
time to repair, unreasonably refused to do so.
The arguments put forth in Yanofsky for implying an agree
ment to indemnify would be equally applicable even in the ab
sence of an express agreement to repair. 213 The major obstacle for
the courts to overcome will be implying an agreement to repair in
a commercial setting. If such an agreement is found, the duty to
repair should carry with it a duty to indemnify in the event of a
landlord's breach. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to find
ing the landlord at fault for failing to prevent the injury while
placing the burden of compensation on the tenant.
210. This theory is discussed in detail in text accompanying notes 189-91
supra.
21l. These decisions are discussed in text accompanying notes 149-71 supra.
212. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, §§ 15, 19 (West 1977). For the text of
§ 15, see note 200 supra; for the text of § 19, see note 45 supra.
213. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902-05, 403 N.E.2d at 373-75. These arguments are
discussed in text accompanying notes 180-91 supra. The Yanofsky decision made no
reference to a distinction between commercial and residential leases.
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CONCLUSION

In the past, disputes between landlords and tenants were re
solved by reference to the widely recognized view that a lease was
a conveyance of a property interest. The tenant was perceived to
have as much control over the property as he would if he owned it.
Thus, the tenant bore the responsibility for making all necessary
repairs. The failure to repair rule and the accompanying distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance arose from this view. In al
most all situations the law served as a bar to tenants' tort actions
against landlords.
The Massachusetts judiciary shared this view for many years.
In 1973, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court aban
doned its adherence to the principle that a lease is the equivalent
of a conveyance of property. Since 1973 the court has adopted the
position that a lease is a contractual exchange of covenants with ac
companying duties. The trend of decisions in Massachusetts since
1973 has been toward elimination of many barriers to tort recovery
by tenants. The supreme judicial court has shown an unwavering
commitment to holding landlords liable for tortious injuries
incurred as a result of unsafe conditions on premises that the land
lord had a duty to repair.
This commitment was demonstrated further in Young v.
Ganvacki. 214 In Young the supreme judicial court held a landlord
liable for failing to make repairs to an area of the premises within
the tenant's control. The decision is particularly significant because
the landlord had never agreed to make repairs. The court's finding
of an implied agreement to repair was unprecedented. In Young
the Massachusetts judiciary became even further committed to its
policy of protecting tenants.
In Yanofsky, the landlord had expressly agreed to make re
pairs. A customer, Mrs. Vahey, was injured when she slipped on a
wet floor in the A & P store. A leak in the roof, which the landlord,
Yanofsky, had failed to repair, brought about the dangerous condi
tion. Mrs. Vahey sued both Yanofsky and A & P. Both claims were
settled prior to the outcome of the indemnification action by A & P
against Yanofsky. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that, although no agreement to indemnifY existed, such an agree
ment was implied from the agreement to repair. The entire finan
cial responsibility for compensating the injured victim was placed
214.

1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729, 402 N.E.2d at 1045.
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on the landlord. The court abolished the failure to repair rule and
"nonfeasance" barriers to recovery by holding a landlord liable for
failing to repair a defective condition on his premises after he had
expressly agreed to make such repairs. The supreme judicial
court's treatment of the indemnification issue is laudable. Yanofsky
should serve as notice to all landlords in Massachusetts that, in the
future, innocent tenants ultimately will not be responsible for
compensating those injured on a landlord's unsafe property.
.
Residential tenants usually are considered less knowledgeable
than their landlords. Social policy demands that these transient and
often impecunious persons be protected. On the other hand, com
mercial tenants usually are viewed as competent to take care of
themselves. There is often no logical basis for this distinction, how
ever, as the court in Yanofsky demonstrated by providing substan
tial protection to a financially strong commercial tenant. Thus, reli
ance on the distinction between residential and commercial leases
to bar commercial lessors' potential liability, or to bar recovery
against them in the form of indemnification, probably will fail. Fur
thermore, extension of the Yanofsky and Young rationales indicates
that an express agreement to repair will no longer be necessary in
order for the courts to imply an agreement to indemnify. In future
cases complete tenant indemnification should be the rule in all fact
situations where the landlord has notice of dangerous conditions
and reasonable time to repair. When this has been accomplished,
the Massachusetts judiciary will have completed the task, begun in
1973, of making landlord-tenant tort law responsive to contempo
rary needs.

Michael B. Powers

